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ABSTRACT: The resource management problem for the Middle
Platte ecosystem is the insufficient water available to meet both
instream ecological demands and out-of-stream economic needs.
This problem of multiple interest groups competing for a limited
resource is compounded by sharp disagreement in the scientific
community over endangered species’ needs for instream flows. In
this study, game theory was used to address one dimension of this
resource management problem. A sequential auction with repeated
bidding was used to determine how much instream flow water each
of three states – Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming – will provide
and at what price. The results suggest that the use of auction
mechanisms can improve the prospects for reaching a multi-state
agreement on who will supply instream flow water, if the auction is
structured to discourage misrepresentation of costs and if political
compensation is allowed.
(KEY TERMS: environmental conflict resolution; game theory;
water; economics; instream flow; endangered species.)
INTRODUCTION
The Platte River system consists of the North Plat-
te and South Platte Rivers. The North Platte begins
in North Central Colorado, passes through South
Central Wyoming, crosses all of Nebraska, and joins
the Missouri River at Omaha, Nebraska. The South
Platte begins in East Central Colorado and joins the
North Platte River at North Platte, Nebraska. The
Platte system provides irrigation water to more than
one million acres, supplies 300 MW of hydroelectric
power, supports more than two million visitor days 
of recreation each year, and provides critical habitat
for fish and wildlife. The reach of the Platte River
between Lexington and Grand Island, Nebraska,
which is often called the Middle Platte or the Big
Bend Reach, is especially important ecologically. It
provides critical habitat for several protected species,
including the Interior Least Tern, Piping Plover and
Whooping Crane. The Middle Platte also serves as a
migration staging area for thousands of Sandhill
Cranes and each year is the site of an internationally
acclaimed bird watching spectacle.
The different users of the Platte River system are
aggressive competitors for the available water sup-
plies and the riparian lands, resulting in considerable
public controversy and extensive environmental and
economic concern. Since 1976, the Nebraska Depart-
ment of Water Resources (DWR) has held more than
400 days of public hearings to address five major pro-
posed diversions and two instream flow rights for
Platte River water. Since 1985, the public power dis-
tricts in Nebraska have been in negotiations with the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and
environmental interests over the relicensing of Lake
McConaughy, a major storage reservoir on the North
Platte River. From 1986 to 2001, the states of
Wyoming and Nebraska were in litigation over the
interstate allocation of Platte River water. This array
of critical issues, as well as other factors, prompted
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)
to select the Middle Platte in 1994 as one of five eco-
logical risk assessment case studies that were consid-
ered nationally (USEPA, 1996).
At least a dozen stakeholder groups are involved
with the Platte River management problem, when one
considers combinations of geography and principal
impacts of interest. Environmental interests in all
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political jurisdictions (Colorado, Wyoming, Nebraska,
and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) have essen-
tially the same objective – increased stream flow and
management of riparian lands for endangered species
protection. Irrigation interests are much more
parochial between and within states. Upstream sur-
face water irrigators want the right to continue irri-
gating and, in some instances, the right to develop
additional acreage. Downstream surface water irriga-
tors want their water supply protected against addi-
tional depletions from upstream irrigation or from
environmental demands. All ground water irrigators
in all locations want the right to pump at will, regard-
less of stream flow considerations. Hydropower inter-
ests want high reservoirs to maximize feet of head
and would like to make reservoir releases during the
summer months when electricity is worth the most.
Coal fired electric utilities want assured cooling water
supplies and expansion opportunities. Finally, recre-
ation interests have mixed demands, including mod-
erate reservoir storage levels, stream flows that
sustain fishing and waterfowl hunting, and easy
access to the river and to bird watching opportunities.
The central resource management problem is insuf-
ficient water available in the Platte system to meet
all competing demands. This is most starkly indicated
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) claim
that 417 thousand acre feet (kaf) per year of addition-
al water is needed to meet endangered species needs
for the Big Bend Reach. Endangered species require-
ments, as defined by the USFWS, essentially preclude
any water consuming action that constitutes a federal
nexus. This means that U.S. Forest Service leases in
Colorado cannot be renewed, that Wyoming cannot
pursue additional upstream water storage projects
that would increase consumptive use, and that the
public power districts in Nebraska cannot get a long-
term hydropower license from FERC unless some
accommodation of the competing demands can be
made.
The problem of multiple interest groups competing
for a limited resource is compounded by sharp dis-
agreement in the scientific community over endan-
gered species needs. Some scientists contend that
very high stream flows are needed periodically to pre-
vent vegetative growth on sandbars, thus sustaining
the wide and shallow riverine habitat preferred by
Whooping and Sandhill Cranes (Johnson,1996; Curri-
er, 1995). Others contend that such scouring flows are
of little value (Chadwick and Associates, 1994). There
is also scientific disagreement regarding the amount
of riverine habitat needed to sustain and enhance
existing endangered species. Finally, some scientists
suggest that riparian land management can substi-
tute extensively for stream flow, while others are
more skeptical (Habi Tech Inc., 1993).
The Platte River allocation problem is not very
amenable to conventional institutional approaches.
Allocations under the appropriations doctrine cannot
be used to meet all endangered species needs because
the river is already overappropriated. Markets theo-
retically could be used for reallocation, but the free
rider problem discourages all  potential purchasers
from buying water to meet endangered species needs.
Some potential purchasers hope to use the Endan-
gered Species Act to force reallocation, while others
are reluctant to pay unless all parties agree to an
equitable sharing of the burden. This difficult institu-
tional problem has led to several attempts to facilitate
Platte River resource management decisions, includ-
ing empirical modeling with and without stakeholder
input, several negotiation formats, multi-state litiga-
tion, and, most recently, a Cooperative Agreement
(CA) between the states and the U.S. Department of
Interior (USDI) to take an interim adaptive manage-
ment approach to the problem. However, none of
these approaches has led to a comprehensive resource
management plan that addresses the conflicting
demands of competing interest groups. This paper
explores the use of game theory as a resource man-
agement tool for addressing this problem.
Recent developments in game theory suggest that
selected game theory techniques may be useful in
resolving this type of resource management conflict.
Game theoretic models allow economists to study the
implications of rationality, self-interest, and equilibri-
um, both in market interactions that are modeled as
games and in nonmarket interactions (Gibbons,
1997). Game theory has been occasionally applied to
water resource management problems during the past
decade. Becker and Easter (1995) used game theory to
analyze the interdependency among eight states and
two provinces concerning water diversions from the
Great Lakes. Diversion decisions were modeled under
different scenarios with different restrictions on the
lakes where diversions could occur. This was done
with combinations of states and provinces that totaled
as many as ten players. The results suggested that
states do not divert water necessarily because they
stand to gain, but because they may lose more if they
do not. In a case similar to the Middle Platte, Adams
et al. (1996) proposed game theoretic models in the
form of computer simulations to investigate the likely
outcome of negotiations among agricultural water
users, environmental groups, and municipal water
users in California. Their results indicate that the
outcome of the negotiation process depends crucially
on the constitutional structure of the game, the input
each group has in the decision making process, the
coalitions of groups that can implement proposals, the
scope of negotiations, and the outcome if parties fail
to reach agreement.
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In this study we used an auction mechanism to
model part of the decision process. The auction
approach has particular merit for addressing who will
supply instream flow water for the Middle Platte sys-
tem and at what price. In particular, it provides a pro-
cedure for dealing with information asymmetries
among the states. In an auction the parties reveal the
price and preference information that is necessary for
determining a water supply plan.
PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
The general purpose of this analysis was to investi-
gate the use of game models for developing scientifi-
cally sound and politically feasible resource
management plans for the Middle Platte ecosystem.
A complete resource management plan for the ecosys-
tem must address how much water to allocate to
instream flows, which state should provide the water
(Colorado, Nebraska, or Wyoming) and from what
source (ground water irrigation rights, surface water
irrigation rights, or conservation). It also must identi-
fy how the cost of instream flow water should be allo-
cated among the states, the federal government, and
the private sector. This paper focuses on which state
should provide the water and at what price and
addresses the problem within the context of the Coop-
erative Agreement signed in 1997 by Colorado,
Nebraska, Wyoming, and the USDI.
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
Who will provide and pay for the quantity of water
allocated to environmental uses depends on the sup-
ply costs of the available options and on cost share,
supply, and decision policies. Cost share policy con-
cerns the distribution of costs among the three states
and the USDI. There are several potential bases for
determining cost shares, including payments based on
out-of-stream consumptive use, the potential gains
from improved environmental quality, or the relative
economic value of the current water use regime. Sup-
ply policy concerns who should supply the water.
Should it be supplied by the least cost suppliers irre-
spective of whether the supply burden falls dispropor-
tionately on one or more states, or, alternatively,
should each state provide instream flow water in pro-
portion to its contribution to consumptive use? Final-
ly, who supplies the water and at what cost will
depend on the decision policy (i.e., on the institutional
arrangements for making and implementing supply
decisions). In designing an auction model we seek an
institutional procedure that addresses all of these
aspects and results in allocating the desired quantity
of water to environmental needs in an acceptable
manner and at least cost.
The auction was designed as a second price,
sequential auction with repeated bidding and prede-
termined cost shares. The only players are the three
states. There is little need for involvement of environ-
mental and agricultural interests, because their pri-
mary concern is the amount of reallocation, which is
predetermined in the context of this analysis. The fed-
eral government has no further input to make once it
commits to a given cost share. The auction is sequen-
tial in the sense that each state bids in a predeter-
mined order to supply a given quantity of water,
called a block. The bidding continues (repeats) until
all parties except one (the low bidder) have passed.
The block is then supplied by the low bidder at a price
equal to the second lowest bid. Any number of blocks
can be auctioned in this manner, thus tracing out a
supply function. The predetermined cost shares define
how much each state and the USDI contribute to the
cash pool for purchasing environmental water. The
state with the winning bid incurs an obligation to
supply the water in return for a payment from the
cash pool.
In mathematical terms, we consider a set of agents
N = {1, 2, 3}, consisting of the three states: Colorado
(1), Nebraska (2), and Wyoming (3). The Federal Gov-
ernment is a separate agent denoted by a subscript 4
and contributes a cost share, but it is not an active
bidder. Cost shares are predetermined and can be
depicted as s1, s2 , s3, and s4. Hence, 0 ≤ s1, s2, s3, s4 ≤
1 and s1 +  s2 + s4 + s5 = 1. The cost functions for the
states can be denoted by Ci(q), i = 1, 2, 3, where the
cost C for any quantity q consists of three compo-
nents: acquisition cost, AC; third party cost, TP; and
political compensation cost, PC. Hence, Ci(q) = ACi(q)
+ TPi(q) + PCi(q) for all q ≥ 0. ACi(q) represents what
the state will need to pay to acquire or produce the
water, including administrative costs. TPi(q) repre-
sents the costs to the state that are incurred by par-
ties not involved in the procurement decision or
process. Both ACi(q) and TPi(q) are from prior analy-
ses and are known by all players. The sum of ACi(q)
and TPi(q) represents the real resource cost of supply-
ing the water. PCi(q) represents an equity payment
that the supplying party wants as compensation for
the political difficulties inherent in reallocating water.
PCi(q) is not known before the auction occurs. If
PCi(q) were known, the state costs would be transpar-
ent, and for each given quantity Q of water one could
analytically solve for the cost minimizing quantities
q1, q2, and q3 of water from each state such that Q =
q1 + q2 + q3. Because PCi(q) is unknown, however,
the proposed auction model or some variant of it is
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necessary for getting the states to reveal the relevant
cost information or supply preferences.
The states reveal their supply preferences when
each block of water is auctioned by choosing to either
supply the water or pay others to supply it. The way
the auction works is that the winning bidder j sup-
plies the block of water at a cost Cj(q) and receives a
payment equal to the second lowest bid B, but this
bidder also has to pay his predetermined cost share
sj B. Hence, the payoff from winning can be denoted
as Pj = (1 - sj) B - Cj(q). All k players who do not win
have to pay B times sk; hence, their payoffs are Pk = -
sk B. Because in our case players who lose the auction
incur a positive cost, the following equilibrium strate-
gy dominates: all players bid until only the two lowest
cost players remain; then the agent with the second
lowest cost stops at his cost and the lowest cost player
wins the auction with a bid equal (or slightly below)
the second lowest cost. It is well known  that for a
sealed bid second price auction it is a dominant strat-
egy for each player to announce costs truthfully
(Klemperer, 1999). In our case, however, we use a
descending English auction design that does not nec-
essarily result in truthful revelation of all costs, but
because repeated bidding is allowed, it does result in
the same strategic outcome as the second price auc-
tion.
By auctioning successive blocks of water of some
predetermined size one can develop the function TC =
f(Q), which depicts how much it will cost the states
and the USDI to supply varying quantities of
instream flow water.
In Appendix A we prove that the described strategy
profile is indeed a Nash equilibrium, because none of
the players has an incentive to change his strategy.
INPUT DATA
Data requirements for the auction model included
acquisition costs, third party costs, and political com-
pensation costs. Acquisition costs represent the
expected costs of increasing stream flow through sup-
ply augmentation, conservation, or purchasing or
leasing of water from agriculture. Third party costs
represent the economic value of the expected indirect
effects on people who are not directly involved in pro-
viding the instream flow water. Political compensa-
tion (PC) costs are the payments above expected
opportunity costs that the states may demand as com-
pensation for the political turmoil associated with
agreeing to supply a given quantity of water.
Acquisition costs were compiled from a recent
report prepared by Boyle Engineering for use by the 
states and the USDI in resolving the Middle Platte
management problem (Boyle Engineering Corpora-
tion, 1999).  Estimated acquisition costs for water
supplied by Colorado ranged from $115 to $272 per
acre foot per year.  Nebraska’s costs were estimated at
$72 to $285 and Wyoming’s from $47 to $224 per acre
foot.  However, Nebraska was estimated to have 110
kaf available at less than $100 per acre foot, whereas
Wyoming had only 20 kaf available at this cost and
Colorado had none.
The estimated third party costs consisted primarily
of the secondary effects from reduced irrigation activi-
ty, such as the reduced personal income of people
engaged in supplying  inputs or processing farm prod-
ucts. Third party costs were assumed to be 10 percent
of acquisition costs based on historical levels of unem-
ployment and underemployment and on regional
input-output model results for the region (Jenkins
and Konecny, 1999). This estimate reflects an
assumption that a small amount of resources will
remain underemployed over the long term as the eco-
nomic base provided by irrigated agriculture declines.
The estimate further assumes that there will be no
offsetting increase in economic activity resulting from
improved instream flows, because a change in stream
flow that increases the population of endangered
species is unlikely to induce any changes in economi-
cally significant activities such as recreation.
The concept of political compensation costs was
incorporated in the auction game as a mechanism for
reaching an agreement when all parties to the negoti-
ation (auction) are both buyers and sellers. All parties
can choose either to sell water to the group at a price
that is equal to or greater than their real supply cost
(AC + TP) or to pay their share of the cost of purchas-
ing the water from someone else.  If all parties
(states) cared only about real supply costs, there
would be no need for an auction, because the solution
would necessarily consist of the least cost options irre-
spective of their location. Other considerations are
reflected in the sales price, however, including risk
and various political considerations. The difference
between the real supply cost and the offer price is
defined here as political compensation. These values
can be estimated based on survey responses from
state representatives and/or inferred from actual
game results, if it becomes feasible to actually play
the game. For purposes of this analysis, three PC cost
scenarios were defined: zero, moderate, and high.
They can be represented mathematically as
PCM = AC x 0.04 x Bs
PCH = AC x 0.08 x Bs
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(1)
(2)
where PCM and PCH = moderate and high political
compensation cost, respectively; AC = water acquisi-
tion cost, $/acre foot; and Bs = number of 10 kaf blocks
of water supplied by state s. PC costs were assumed
to escalate exponentially as the amount of water sup-
plied by a single state increased, because political
resistance to reallocating water from out-of-stream to
instream uses is likely to increase as quantity
increases.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The second price auction model was used to simu-
late who will supply instream flow water and at what
cost, under the three assumed political compensation
policies: no compensation, moderate, and high. The
simulations further assumed a cost share policy con-
sisting of Colorado 0.2, Nebraska 0.2, Wyoming 0.1,
and the USDI 0.5. The rules of the auction required
sequential bidding until two parties had passed, with
minimum bid increments of $0.50 per acre foot.
Results were computed for water supply quantities
ranging from 10 to 400 kaf per year, although the wel-
fare comparisons were calculated for only one quanti-
ty, 140 kaf. This quantity was chosen because it
corresponds to the target quantity adopted by the
states and the USDI under the terms of the Coopera-
tive Agreement.
The water supply results show that under a no
political compensation policy the costs are lowest, but
Nebraska would need to supply 110 out of 140 kaf, or
79 percent of the water. Wyoming would supply 30 kaf
and Colorado none (Table 1). This suggests that some
political compensation is likely to be necessary to
reach a water supply agreement, because no player is
likely to be willing to supply this much of the total
instream flow requirement. The required compensa-
tion will emerge in the bid prices if a second-price
auction is conducted or could be negotiated as a pric-
ing policy. If the players behaved according to the
moderate political compensation case, Nebraska
would supply 100 kaf , Wyoming 40 kaf, and Colorado
none, which is probably a more politically acceptable
solution, but budget costs increase by 16 percent, or
$2.5 million per year, and welfare costs by 1.5 per-
cent, or 0.2 million per year (Table 1). Under the high
political compensation case, the water supply solution
is still more likely to be acceptable at 80, 40, and 20
kaf for Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado, respective-
ly, but budget costs have increased by 30 percent and
welfare costs by 0.8 percent over the no compensation
case. These findings reflect the fact that most of the
low cost water is in Nebraska, and thus a water sup-
ply plan based on cost minimization is not likely to be
politically acceptable. Under these circumstances, one
would expect Nebraska to bid high in order to either
get adequate political compensation or induce another
player to supply the water, whichever comes first.
The use of a second price rather than a first price
auction increases the budgetary cost of providing the
water relative to the theoretical minimum. The theo-
retical minimum is the lowest price at which a given
supplier is willing to supply a given quantity, includ-
ing political compensation. The difference between
the supplier’s minimum price and the second lowest
bid price constitutes an increased budgetary cost and
a transfer of welfare to the supplying party from the
other participants. At the 140 kaf  level, budgetary
costs were 16.3, 9.0, and 7.8 percent higher than the
theoretical minimum for the zero, moderate, and high
political compensation cases, respectively (Table 1).
Although these numbers suggest that a second price
auction increases budgetary costs significantly rela-
tive to the theoretical minimum, it is important to
note that in a real world setting the minimum price
remains unknown. A first price auction is an alterna-
tive that could lower budgetary costs, but because of
the incentive to cheat, it may actually result in bud-
getary costs that exceed the second-price budgetary
values, and there is no assurance that welfare costs
will not be higher as well. Under a second price auc-
tion, one is at least assured that the dominant strate-
gy will lead to a supply regime that minimizes total
welfare costs. 
In a first price auction, the bidders have an incen-
tive to “cheat” by offering to supply water at a price
above their minimum supply prices, hoping that
another supplier will not underbid them. If this hap-
pens, true supply prices have not been revealed and
buyers have paid more than the necessary supply
costs. In a second price auction, however, all suppliers
have an incentive to reveal their true supply prices,
because the price they will receive if they win the bid
is not their bid price, but rather the price of the next
highest bidder. This ensures that total welfare costs
are at a minimum, because the bidder with the mini-
mum cost actually supplies the water, but the actual
cash transfer, called a budgeted cost, may be higher
by an amount equal to the difference between the
winning bid and the next highest price.
Welfare costs represent the real cost of the water to
all parties combined. Net welfare is equal to the bud-
get cost less that part of the budget cost that repre-
sents transfer payments. Both the second price gain
and the political compensation payments affect the
distribution of welfare among the parties but do not
affect total welfare because the loss to the paying
party equals the gain to the receiving party.  Net wel-
fare is affected only by what economists call real
resource costs, which in this case consist of water
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acquisition and third party costs.  Hence, net welfare
changes only if there is a change in who supplies the
water and from what source.
The differences between the welfare costs and the
budgetary costs for supplying 140 kaf of water under
three different political compensation scenarios also
suggest that the second price effect significantly
changes the distribution of welfare costs (Table 1).
Whereas, for example, Nebraska’s share of the budget
is 20 percent, the second price effect reduces its share
of the welfare cost to only 8.4, 12.3, and 15.6 percent,
respectively, for zero, moderate, and high political
compensation. Essentially, Nebraska’s gain from the
second price effect goes down as its share of the total
quantity supplied goes down.
The 140 kaf  illustration shows that whereas total
budget costs increased substantially with increases in
political compensation, the welfare costs for all partic-
ipants combined increased only slightly. This is
because political compensation increases total welfare
costs only if it results in someone with higher real
costs supplying the water. If political compensation
merely makes the same water supply plan politically 
acceptable, then there is a welfare distribution effect
but no change in total welfare costs. The distribution
effect is very large, however. For our illustrative case,
Colorado and Nebraska both bore 20 percent of the
budget cost, but their respective shares of the welfare
cost were Colorado 23.2 and Nebraska 9.8 percent,
with no political compensation, and Colorado 26.6 and
Nebraska 0.0 percent when moderate compensation
was assumed. These distributional effects result from
the fact that water supply solutions have Nebraska
supplying most of the water, while Colorado supplies
very little, even when political compensation is sub-
stantial.
Another way of viewing the results is in terms of
how much instream flow water could be supplied for a
given budget under alternate political compensation
policies.  At a budget of, for example, $15 million per
year, it would be possible to supply 140 kaf of water if
no party demands political compensation, but only
100 kaf if the high level of political compensation is
used (Figure 1).
The total cost function for supplying environmental
water with moderate political compensation was used 
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TABLE 1. Welfare Effects From Supplying 140 kaf of Environmental Water.
Welfare Costs
Level of Political Compensation Colorado Nebraska Wyoming U.S. Total
None
Water Supplied (kaf) 0 110 30 0 140
Budget Cost ($/yr) -3,057,823 -3,057,803 -1,528,912 -7,644,560 -15,289,120
Second Price Gain 0 +1,772,443 +360,652 0 +2,133,095
Political Compensation 0 0 0 0 0
Net Welfare* -3,057,823 -1,285,360 -1,168,260 -7,644,560 -13,156,003
Moderate
Water Supplied (kaf) 0 100 40 0 140
Budget Cost ($/yr) -3,552,900 -3,552,900 - 1,776,450 -8,882,250 -17,764,500
Second Price Gain 0 +1,362,207 +404,612 0 +1,776,819
Political Compensation 0 +2,201,000 +442,700 0 +2,643,700
Net Welfare 3,552,900 +10,307 -929,138 -8,882,250 -13,353,981
High
Water Supplied (kaf) 20 80 40 0 140
Budget Cost ($/yr) -3,960,740 -3,960,740 -1,980,370 -9,901,850 -19,803,700
Second Price Gain +111,191 +867,424 +469,561 0 +1,448,176
Political Compensation +372,900 +2,881,100 +889,500 0 +4,143,500
Net Welfare -3,476,649 -212,216 -621,309 -9,901,850 -14,212,024
*Welfare costs represent the real cost of the water to all parties combined. Net welfare is equal to the budget cost less that part of the budget 
*cost which represents transfer payments. Both the second price gain and the political compensation payments affect the distribution of 
*welfare among the parties but do not affect total welfare because the loss to the paying party equals the gain to the receiving party.
in later research as a partial basis for survey ques-
tions to determine reallocation policy preferences. It
is clear from the shape of the cost functions that there
are many options for finding a bargained solution to
water reallocation. If there is no alternative to the
moderate compensation supply function that is
acceptable to all groups, it might be possible to shift
the supply function to match an acceptable solution
by persuading the supplying states to accept less
political compensation.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Plans for management of the Middle Platte ecosys-
tem have been mired in controversy for more than
two decades. The central issue is how much water is
needed to meet the needs of threatened and endan-
gered species, who will supply the water, and at what
price. The controversy has been intractable in part
because of scientific disagreements and in part
because the parties have been reluctant to potentially
undercut their respective negotiating positions by
revealing their true preferences. Some progress was
made in 1997 with the signing of the Cooperative 
Agreement. This agreement established an interim
target of 140 kaf in contrast to a USFWS request for
417 kaf, but it did not establish where the water was
to come from and at what cost. This analysis proposes
an auction approach for deciding who will supply the
instream flow water for endangered species and at
what price.
Simulation results suggest that a second price
sequential auction would be an effective mechanism
for getting potential suppliers to reveal their mini-
mum prices for supplying different quantities of
water. Actual costs depended on how much political
compensation was required to induce individual
states to supply the water rather than pay others to
supply it. The theoretical minimum supply costs
would occur if the parties were willing to reveal their
minimum prices and if they did not demand a pay-
ment above real supply costs, called political compen-
sation, in return for supplying the water. Simulated
results assuming no political compensation showed
one state supplying 79 percent of the water, a situa-
tion that is unlikely to be politically acceptable.
Hence, two political compensation simulations were
run that resulted in inducing a supply regime that is
much more likely to be acceptable to all parties, albeit
at much higher budgetary costs.
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Figure 1. Total Budgeted Cost for Supplying Environmental Water Under
Different Political Compensation Policies.
APPENDIX A.
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We prove that the following strategy is a Nash
Equilibrium: “all players bid until only the two lowest
cost players remain; then the agent with the second
lowest cost stops at his cost and the lowest cost player
wins the auction with a bid equal (or slightly below)
the second lowest cost.”
We start with the winning player j. As long as play-
er j wins, his payoff is: 
Pj = (1 - sj) B - Cj(q) = (B - Cj(q)) - sj B.
The only way for player j to change the outcome is
to lose the auction. The only way for agent j to lose is
to stop bidding at a bid B´ ≥ B. Then the second low-
est cost player wins and receives a payment B´´ ≥ B.
Hence agent j’s new payoff equals P´j = - sj B´´. How-
ever, P´j = - sj B´´ ≤ - sj B ≤ (B - Cj(q)) - sj B = Pj. So, 
Pj ≥ P´j, which means that player j will not be better
off if he deviates from his original strategy.
Next, consider one of the losing players k. Since we
assume that the winning player bids the second low-
est costs (or slightly less), as long as player k loses his
payoff, is Pk = - sk B. The only way to change the out-
come for a nonwinning agent k is to win the auction
by bidding below his cost. If agent k wins the auction,
he will receive a payment of B´ ≤ B. Hence agent k’s
new payoff equals P´k = (1 - sj) B´ - Ck(q). However, 
(1 - sk) B´- Ck(q) ≤ (1 - sk) B - Ck(q) = (B - Ck(q)) - sk B
≤ - sk B = Pk. So, Pk ≥ P´k, which means that player k
will not profit if he deviates from his original strategy.
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